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Abstract
Ronald Coase has shown that well-defined property rights and the absence of transaction costs ensure that bargaining can lead
to efficient environment allocation. In France, as in most developed countries, fishing rights are well-defined and belong to
land-owners. However in many cases these rights are traditionally given for free to anglers associations (AAPPMA). AAPPMA
are the basic institutions in charge of angling management in France. In a first part we describe how private fishing rights are
institutionally turned into public goods. This is the basis of the French democratic angling rule : fishing "everywhere, for
everyons and at low cost".
In a second part we analyze the economic drawbacks of foregone property rights. Two main external effects arise from the
public nature of recreational fishing in France. First we deal with externalities between anglers, known as the "tragedy of the
comrnons". Then we describe the extemal effects between land owners (mostly farmers) and anglers. This leads to pollution and
loss of environmental services,
At present in France, the management system in place relies only on public policy to solve the externality problem because
property rights are given up. Public intervention is necessary in many cases. In the last part we explore the compatibility
between the Flench egalitarian angling system and better economic efficiency and anglers' welfare. For specific extemalities we
suggest the possibility of fishing rights bargaining between AAPPMA and land-owners. Efficient pricing by AAPPMA could
simultaneously cope with congestion, if any, and environmental management.
In conclusion we suggest how economic research could contribute to quantify these externalities and clarify the policy debate
by quantifying the demand for angling.
Introduction this fishing right as a property right, but it is indeed a
right to use the resource. Property rights include the
right to fish and the duty to maintain the environmen-
tal quality at the site where the right does apply. The
rights and duties associated with fishing rights are
defined by the law 
- 
Article L .230-L.235 in the Rural
Code.
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This paper looks at the efficiency ofrecreational flsh-
ing management in France. We argue that angling
policy is not leading to efficient resource allocation.
Because we believe that this inefficiency can be ex-
plained by the structure of property rights, the paper
is organized as follows. Firstly we present fishing right
management in France. Secondly, we explain how eco-
nomic theory provides analytic tools for the interpre-
tation of external effects by focusing on properfy
rights. Finally, we show that property-right enforce-
ment could regulate some ofthe negative externalities
affecting angler's welfare.
How angling policy has led to the loss of fishing
rights in tr'rance:
historical and institutional reasons
In France, fishing rights belong to landowners, as rn
many countries. We will refer in the following text to
In the Middle-Ages, fishing rights belonged to the
Lord. Fishing rights were viewed as privileges and
were abolished by the French revolution of 1789. At
this stage, anyone could go fishing anywhere @reton,
1993). Soon after, in 1794, fishing rights were re-es-
tablished. In the early 20th century sport flshermen
achieved the recognition of angling in comparisson
to commercial fi shing (Thib ault, 1992). Recreational
fishing was free, until a law was introduced on July
the lZth,1941. This law abolished free recreational
fishing by obliging every angler to paying a fee to an
anglers association (AAPPMAt). This situation is still
true today. Even a property right owner has to acquire
a fishing license to fish, even where he owns the right.
1 ln French : Associations Agréées de Pêche et de Protection des Milieux Aquatiques
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In France, the agencies in charge ofrecreational fish-
ing management are theAAPPMAs. They are aggre-
gated into departmental and regional federations.
AAPPMAs are concemed with the management of
recreational fishing as well as the environmental qual-
ity of waterways. The application of the law concern-
ing angling is assumed by the government agency
responsible for inland fishing (CSP'z).
Adequate property rights must be specified com-
pletely, transferable and enforced. In France, fishing
rights have these properties. In theory all the elements
are present to reach economic efficiency in resowce
allocation. However, the history and institutional or-
ganization ofrecreational fishing in France leads to
some problems: property rights are traditionally at-
tenuated, which can be viewed as a heritage from the
French revolution; the angler's lobbying proved effi-
cient in leading to a very low level of fee implementa-
tion; the l94l law was modified in 1984 to provide
better protection of rivers and a democratization of
recreational fishing. From these follows, that in France
angling is quasi-open-access. The fishing fee is very
low and there are multiple forms of exemption. Indeed,
20oÂ ofanglers are exempted. The national federation
ofAAPPMAs (LJNPF) is making the democratic rule
ofrecreational fishing a priority. The rule enforced by
the UNPF is"fishing everywherefor everyone at low
cost". The govemment, via the CSP, encourage the
democratization of recreational fishing and made it a
goal in the law change of 1984. Owners of fishing
rights are encouragrd to give-up their rights. It is unu-
sual that the rights are sold to the AAPPMA. In 2000,
the government provided a legal framework for
giving-up property right in a decree that specifies the
way rights can be given free of charge toAAPPMAs.
AAPPMAs also set agreements between regional fed-
eration. By paying a low additional fee, an angler can
fish in all the department or the entire region. Recently,
national agreements have arisen. They are reciprocal
agreements which allows a recreational fisherman who
pays the reciprocal fee to fish almost everywhere in
France. However, a few AAPPMAs are opposed to
this system, which they find incompatible with an "en-
vironmentally friendly and responsible recreational
fishing". This institutional framework leads to a non-
optimal situation from an economist's point of view.
The economic problem associated with property
rights attenuation
In France, fishing is accessible to everybody, with al-
most no restrictions, at a very modest price. Thus,
recreational fishing has become a quasi-public-good
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in most regions of France. The attenuation of prop-
erty rights is the source ofthree types ofexternalities
that negatively affect the angler's welfare. An accept-
able definition ofan extemality is given by Pigou (1920)
as an effect imposed by an individual A on the welfare
of an individual B, without compensation. For recrea-
tional fishing, the three main extemalities that can be
identified are the following :
two externalities among anglers taking the form of
stock externality and congestion,
externality between anglers and farmers taking the
form of pollution and loss of environmental serv-
ices.
Externalities among anglers arise because a private
good (recreational fishing) is institutionally tumed into
a public good. As there is almost no cost for recrea-
tional fishing, it becomes an open-access resource.
Since Hardin (1968) we know that open-access re-
sources are subject to "the tragedy of the commons".
Because fishing is free, anglers enter the fishery until
marginal welfare per angler is zero. This phenomenon
has been modeled by Fisher and Krutilla (1972) for
recreational activities in general and more recently, for
recreational fi shing by Anderson (1 993).
The stock externality should be limited by imposing
limitations on the number of anglers. Economic effi-
ciency is attained when the marginal willingness to
pay for an additional fish equals the marginal stock
extemality. There is such a point, associated with a
number of anglers. Effrcient policy would tend to reach
this point.
Congestion problems are very similar to stock exter-
nalities. These are also related to the high number of
anglers on the rivers. There is little information on the
impact of congestion in France. If we consider that
recreational flrshing is an activity where anglers look
for calm and solitude, then we expect congestion to be
present. Congestion affects anglers in the same way
as stock extemality.
It is likely that recreational fishing does not affect the
stock levels in France. However we know that for some
stocks (e.g. spring salmon) recreational fishing repre-
sents a real threat. Surveys made by AAPPMAs tend
to show the absence ofcongestion on French rivers,
at least locally. A national survey conducted in 1990
revealed that for lÙYo ofthe anglers congestion was a
reason to limit their visits (ISL, 1990). Moreover it is
noted that for some periods like opening-day, public
holidays or weekends, congestion is evident.
a
2 ln French: Conseil Supérieur de la Pêche (National Fishing Council).
3 ln French: Union Nationale pour la Pêche Française.
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Anglers can be considered as free riders. Because an-
glers are not paying for the property rights, landown-
ers (mostly farmers) are not incited to account for them.
If landowners could trade their rights, they would be
encouraged to improve fishing qualify and to preserve
the environment. Anglers are not the only users, by
far, ofrivers and the associated amenities. Anglers alone
cannot manage the issues of drinkable water, loss of
biodiversity, floods, coastal pollution, etc. Because
transaction costs are too high and water is a public
good, these extemal effects deserve specif,rc public
policies. In France and especially in Brittanya agricul-
ture is very intensive. Briton agriculture is mostly in-
tensive animal growing which releases to the environ-
ment, and then directly to the riverss, huge quantities
of nitrates, phosphates and heavy metals. However, in
some areas these effects are local. For these we be-
lieve that anglers action can have an effect because
transaction costs are low. Agriculfure areas along the
rivers is a problem to recreational fishing in terms of
access and scenic nature ofthe rivers. The cropping
of com for cattle feeding is threat to the rivers, in terms
ofpesticide release into the rivers and bank erosion.
Property rights enforcement could reduce the exter-
nalities associated with the open-access situation. It
works if transaction costs are low, which is the case
for the latter extemal effects.
Ideas to conciliate theAAPPMAs system and
economic efficiency
We have seen that property rights do exist but are
attenuated. Recreational fishing is therefore a common
pool resource subject to Hardin's tragedy of the com-
mons. Then, anglers can be viewed as free riders and
this leads to a non optimal situation with negative ex-
temalities that lower anglers' welfare.This sifuation can
be solved by simply enforcing well-defined property
rights. Economic literature has largely shown the close
relationship between property rights and externalities
@emsetz, 1967).
Coase (1960) has shown that well-defined property
rights are a sufficient condition to reach economic ef-
ficiency ifthere are no transaction costs. This result is
valid whatever the initial distribution of property rights.
Coase suggestion's is that bargaining for property
rights will lead to the efficient allocation ofresources.
The hypothesis of no transaction costs limits the ap-
plication of Coase's solution.
In France everything conceming rivers and recrea-
tional fishing, relies on public policy. Environmental
JULIEN SALANTÊ tuo Pmuppt LE GIFFE
policy is based on two majorpolicies. Firstly, the wa-
ter policy to deal with pollution. A public policy is
necessary, due to high transaction costs at the scale
of the water basin and the public nature of water. Sec-
ondly, agricultural policy uses many specific tools.
Agri-environmental measures (European common ag-
ricultural policy) and territorial farm contracts (French
policy) are policies that can affect the riparian agricul-
tural parcels. They take the form ofgrassland premi-
ums, subsidies to conserve wetlands and to clean river
banks. Since market transaction-costs are low for these
amenities, coasian bargaining could be more efficient
than a costly public policy.
Recreational fishing policies are based on many
measures. The most important measures are clo-
sure periods, size limits, daily bag limits, technical
restrictions on bait and hooks, a TAC for salmon
and stock enhancement. These measures do not
affect the level ofcongestion on the French rivers.
Worse, these measures are probably useless to pre-
serve stocks (Thibault, I 9 92) and ar e r adic al regard-
ing angler's welfare. Restrictions imposed on fish-
ing periods are necessary during spawning peri-
ods but sometimes they are extended widely into
traditional fi shing periods.
However, we think the system can be maintained
and improved. At present, anglers are paying a fee
for the entire year. Instead they might be paying at
the margin i.e. for each additional visit. In this way,
fishermen will limit their visits, which will have posi-
tive effects on congestion and probably stocks. It
is also possible to imagine a system to restrict trips
during high congestion periods like public holidays
or the opening day. This could take the form of
quotas ofanglers or lotteries like in Spain. Indeed,
lotteries match the AAPPMAs democratic system.
For several types of local external effects where
transaction costs are low (bank cleaning, creation
of environmental buffers, conservation of wetlands,
etc), we suggest property right bargaining between
AAPPMAs and farmers.
It is noted that the transition period between the ac-
tual system and a more sustainable one is a problem.
At this stage, anglers will pay for property rights but
rivers will only improve in the longer term. For this
reason, we think that anglers will be reluctant to pay.
Finally, we need to control income effects. Indeed
strong income effects are not compatible with the
democratic rules of AAPPMAs. The implementation
ofsocial pricing looks like an appropriated solution.
4 Brittany is the western part of France. lt has reputation for its beautiful rivers in which one can fish trout or salmon.
5 There is no phreatic in Brittany due to the granitic susbstrate.
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Conclusion
We have shown fishing rights are haditionally released
for free in France. The institutions in charge ofrecrea-
tional fishing management orgarizethe attenuation of
property rights. The results is that recreational fish-
ing is institutionally tumed into a public good. Three
types ofexternalities arise from this situation : stock
extemalities, congestion and pollution. Property rights
bargaining could improve the situation. Anglers would
pay more for good quality fishing and environmental
improvements. Moreover, by reducing the number of
anglers, it will cope simultaneously with congestion
and stock externality.
Economic research can contribute to the policy de-
bate by quantifying the welfare losses linked to these
extemalities. This can be done by measuring the de-
mand functions using contingent valuation method,
travel cost method and random utility models. Index-
ing demand functions on indicators of environmental
quality (agriculture), congestion and stock level al-
lows for the calculation of welfare variations linked to
the improvements. In this way, economic research can
give arguments for the implementation of new poli-
cies.
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